Abstract-West Bengal potato farmers cannot directly access wholesale markets and do not know wholesale prices. Local middlemen earn large margins; pass-through from wholesale to farmgate prices is negligible. When we informed farmers in randomly chosen villages about wholesale prices, average farmgate sales and prices were unaffected, but pass-through to farmgate prices increased. These results can be explained by a model where farmers bargain ex post with village middlemen, with the outside option of selling to middlemen outside the village. They are inconsistent with standard oligopolistic models of pass-through, search frictions, or risk-sharing contracts.
I. Introduction

I
T is generally believed that middlemen in agricultural value chains in developing countries appropriate significant margins (Morisset, 1998) . However, there is little evidence on how large these margins are and why they occur. Trading mechanisms between farmers and traders are also not well understood. 1 Do farmers and traders enter into ex ante risk-sharing contracts, or do they bargain only at the time of sale? What are farmers' outside options? Do farmers know less about price movements in downstream markets than traders do, and does this worsen their bargaining position? A better understanding of these issues may explain the observed low and unresponsive farmgate prices that arguably perpetuate poverty and limit agricultural growth. It could also explain why the gains from export growth do not trickle down to the ultimate producers and whether increasing farmers' access to price information could affect these outcomes.
We examine these questions in the context of the supply chain for potatoes, a high-value cash crop in the Indian state of West Bengal. Farmers in our study area sell most of their potatoes to village middlemen, who aggregate purchases and then resell them at wholesale markets (mandis) to bulk buyers from distant cities or neighboring states. Not only do farmers lack direct access to mandis; they are also unaware of the prices at which their potatoes are resold there. The gaps between these resale prices and farmgate prices are large: in the year of our study, farmgate prices were 44% to 46% of wholesale prices. Our calculations suggest that middlemen earned 50% to 71% of this gap. The pass-through from retail prices to farmgate prices was a statistically insignificant, negligible 2%, while pass-through to wholesale prices was a much larger 81%.
The lack of direct access to wholesale markets is a distinctive feature of the West Bengal potato supply chain. In some other Indian states, farmers sell directly to wholesale buyers, and middlemen play no role (Goyal, 2010; Fafchamps & Minten, 2012; Jensen, 2007) . Increased access to price information in such environments improves spatial arbitrage across markets, reducing price dispersion (Jensen 2007) and increasing average prices (Goyal, 2010) . 2 In yet other contexts, farmers enter into advance contracts with middlemen but are also able to sell directly in a spot market; the resulting moral hazard problem limits the amount of risk sharing (Blouin & Machiavello, 2013; Machiavello & Morjaria, 2015; Saenger, Torero, & Qaim, 2014) . However, West Bengal potato markets resemble other vertical market structures such as for Ugandan coffee (Fafchamps & Hill, 2008) and Mozambican cashews (McMillan, Rodrik, & Welch, 2002) .
A key goal of our paper is to understand the nature of trading relationships between middlemen and farmers. Do middlemen enter into ex ante risk-sharing relationships with farmers (as in Hart, 1983; Ligon, Thomas, & Worrall, 2002 , Machiavello, 2010 ? Could these account for the low pass-through rates, and can middleman margins 2 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS be understood as insurance premiums? Or do middlemen engage in oligopolistic competition, with or without search frictions, as in most models of pass-through in the trade and industrial-organizational literature? Our surveys indicate that many farmers engage in repeat transactions with the same traders. However, they rarely report being bound by an advance contractual arrangement, either explicit or implicit. Instead, most farmers say that they receive daily price offers from village middlemen and then respond by either selling immediately, holding out for a future sale, or transporting their potatoes to a neighboring small market (called a haat) to sell to a different middleman. This suggests that they engage in spot bargaining and that village middlemen and middlemen in haats compete sequentially.
This paper develops a model of such a trading mechanism and uses a field experiment to discriminate empirically between this model and other competing models. In our model, village middlemen collude, but compete with middlemen located in the haats. While bargaining with the village middleman, the farmer's outside option is to sell to this haat middleman. The price that the haat middleman offers is higher than the price that village middleman would offer under monopsony. It also varies with the actual wholesale price. In this way, this outside option generates competitive pressure on the village middlemen. Price offers from the village middleman inform farmers about the price offer they will receive if they hold out and approach the haat middleman instead. While this bargaining game has many equilibria, we focus on equilibria that generate the largest profits for the village middleman: these are fully nonrevealing (or pooling), so that the village middleman's price offer does not vary at all with the wholesale price. 3 In this way, the model explains the observed negligible pass-through from wholesale to farmgate prices. The model also predicts that an intervention informing the farmer about prevailing wholesale prices would increase the pass-through of wholesale prices to farmgate prices. This intervention changes the farmer's information about his outside option, and so changes the price that the village middleman offers him. Whether the effect is positive or negative depends on the content of the information: when a treated farmer learns that his outside option is high, the middleman offers him higher prices. When instead he learns that it is low, the middleman offers him lower prices. On average, these heterogeneous effects on farmgate prices tend to cancel out.
To test these predictions, in 2008 we conducted a field experiment in 72 randomly chosen villages from two potatogrowing districts of West Bengal. The villages were randomly assigned to one of two treatment groups or to a control group. In the treatment groups, we provided farmers with daily information about the prevailing potato prices in neighboring wholesale and retail markets. In one variant, called the private information treatment, four randomly selected farmers in each of 24 villages received the information through phone calls from our team of telecallers. In the public information treatment, the information was posted publicly in 24 villages. In the control villages, no information was provided. Concurrently, we collected high-frequency data on potato cultivation, harvest, sales and related revenues, and costs from a random sample of potato farmers in each village. Our analysis of the annual average quantity sold and price received by farmers validates our theoretical predictions: the intervention increased the pass-through from wholesale to farmgate prices and there was no average effect on farmgate prices and sales.
In the context of our model, these results imply that ex ante, the information interventions did not change farmers' welfare and reduced traders' welfare. Ex post, the welfare effects depend on the actual realizations of wholesale prices. 4 Our experimental findings contrast sharply with the predictions of contracting or search friction models. Contracts where farmers and middlemen share risk predict that better information would increase trading volumes when the wholesale price is low, since improving farmers' price information reduces screening distortions in low-price states. Also, contrary to models of risk-sharing contracts, WB potato middlemen did not make net losses ex post at any wholesale price realization. Finally, we do not observe a decrease in the dispersion of farmgate prices, as would be predicted by models of search frictions.
Our results suggest that policy interventions that improve farmers' information about resale prices are unlikely to reduce average middleman margins or enhance farmer welfare. The deeper problem is that middlemen wield considerable market power because West Bengal potato farmers lack direct access to wholesale markets. This lack of market access merits further investigation.
II. The Context: Potato Production and Sales
Potatoes generate the highest value-added per acre of all cash crops produced in West Bengal (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2011; Maitra et al., 2017) . The crop is planted between October and December and harvested between January and March. The farmer might sell part of his output immediately, place some in home stores to be sold at any time in the next two or three months, and place the rest in cold stores, to be sold at any time until the cold stores are emptied in November. 5
A. Farmer-Trader Transactions and Market Structure
Farmers sell more than 90% of their marketed potatoes to traders operating within the same village (see table 1). 6 The average village has about ten such middlemen. They make price offers to local farmers on a daily basis. Farmers who choose not to sell to them can instead sell to traders at local markets (haats) located an average of 5 km from the village. Traders check the quantity and quality of potatoes that they buy, transport them to wholesale markets (mandis) located 8 km away on average, where they negotiate sales to traders from city markets or neighboring states. 7 Most potatoes are sold ultimately to consumers in retail markets in Kolkata or neighboring states. In a 2007 survey, farmers reported selling 72% of their potatoes to buyers whom they had been selling to for a year or more and 32% to buyers whom they had been selling to for two years or more. However, this does not necessarily imply that they have prior contractual arrangements. In fact, our surveys indicate contracts are not common. In 2007, farmers sold only 21% of their potatoes to buyers from whom they had an outstanding loan. Farmers also told us that they were not bound to sell to the trader who had provided them inputs or credit but were free to sell to someone else and to use the proceeds to repay the loan. In surveys we conducted in 2012, only 33% of the 144 randomly selected middlemen who purchased potatoes in our study villages reported a prior agreement to buy from their oldest supplier that year. A mere 6% reported an explicit arrangement about the quantity that they would buy, and 16% reported either an explicit or implicit understanding about the price they would pay.
Trader survey results are consistent with the hypothesis of collusion among village middlemen: 43% to 51% of traders admitted that they exchanged information about recent price offers with other traders before making offers to farmers, and about 40% said they checked recent sale prices with farmers. However they are less likely to collude with traders operating at the local haat, since they meet them less frequently and are unable to monitor their transactions.
The evidence also indicates that farmers lack access to wholesale buyers. Direct sales at the wholesale market are extremely rare: they account for less than 2% of sales (table 1) . In informal interviews, wholesale buyers told us that it was "not worth their while" to negotiate small trades and monitor the quantity and quality of potatoes from many different farmers whom they did not know personally.
Ultimately, the market power of middlemen rests on barriers to entry into their line of business. In our 2012 survey, traders told us that capital was the important requirement to enter the potato trade. The median capital requirement reported was Rs 50,000 (mean = Rs 94,472). 8 They also said it was important to have had a prior apprenticeship with a trader for an average of 3.5 years and 3 years of experience cultivating potatoes. Prior contacts with at least 25 farmers and large buyers in at least three distant markets were other important requirements. This suggests that entry requires financial investments as well as investments in relationships, which take time to build.
In addition, the regulatory environment in West Bengal restricts entry into the potato trading business. The West Bengal Agricultural Marketing Committee (APMC) Act requires any large firm seeking to buy directly from farmers to obtain a license from the state government. Cohen (2013) documents the fact that the West Bengal government rarely provides such licenses. No agriretail firms were purchasing potatoes in our sample villages at the time we conducted our study. Thus, the only competition that village traders face is from traders located in the neighboring haat.
B. Farmers' Price Information
Transactions between the traders and buyers from distant markets are often bilateral. Therefore, information about the price that the trader receives is not in the public domain. In our 2007 baseline farmer surveys, 46% said their only source of wholesale price information was the trader they sold to. Only 13% reported asking friends and neighbors, and 6% received information through the media (See appendix table A2). 9 Although public telephone booths, landline phones, and mobile phones were all available to varying extents, farmers told us that they had no contacts at mandis who would tell them the prevailing mandi price.
Responses to our farmer surveys suggest substantial information asymmetry between farmers and traders. Every 8 The average agricultural loan for planting potatoes in these villages is about Rs 8,000 (data collected through informal interviews). Thus Rs 50,000 is a forbiddingly large amount of capital for the average farmer in this village to raise. 9 The media tend not to cover this layer in the supply chain: only three of the mandis in our sample exist in the official database on wholesale prices. The unit of observation is a mandi in a week. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the mean weekly mandi price, and in columns 3 and 4, it is the mean weekly price received by farmers in the catchment area of the mandi. Only price data for weeks 13 and beyond are included for 2007, 2011, and 2012 10 In other words, they (mis-)interpreted the term market price to mean the price they would receive if they took their potatoes to the haat, not the price at which middlemen resold their produce at the mandi. The mean absolute deviation between wholesale prices reported by farmers and actual wholesale prices was 42.5% of the mean actual price. In section IIIB, we present evidence that our information intervention significantly reduced this error.
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C. Price Transmission and Middleman Margins
To what extent do fluctuations in retail prices pass through to traders and farmers? The first column in table 2 presents the result of a regression of weekly mandi prices from 2007, 2008, 2011, and 2012 (only from weeks 13 and beyond for years other than 2008) on the weekly retail price in the relevant destination city market (Kolkata for mandis in Hugli districts and Bhubaneswar for mandis in West Medinipur district). After controlling for mandi-specific annual potato yields and year, mandi, and week fixed effects, the passthrough from city prices to the mandi prices is considerable: a Re 1 increase in the city price is associated with a Re 0.81 increase in the mandi price. We confirm that the passthrough is large and significant within 2008, the year of our study (column 2). However, as column 3 of the table shows, in 2008, when city prices increased by Re 1, the change in farmgate prices was a statistically nonsignificant Re 0.02. Column 4 shows that the pass-through from 10 The gross price at which a farmer sold at a market is computed by dividing the total revenue he received from selling at a market across all weeks in the year, by the quantity sold. The average of this number across all farmers who sold at haats is Rs 2.55. mandi prices to farmgate prices is also small (0.04) and nonsignificant.
We can use our farmer survey data together with the wholesale price information to make an estimate of the margins that middlemen earn. Since we do not have data on traders' actual selling costs in 2008, we use as estimates the unit cost data for transport, handling, and storage reported by farmers. Traders might exploit economies of scale and connections with store owners to reduce their unit costs below these numbers; if so, using farmer reports for unit costs gives us a lower bound to trader net margins. Details of the calculation are provided in table A1 in the appendix. The lower bounds on mean net trader margins in 2008 are Rs 1.85 per kg at harvesttime, and Rs 1.36 per kg after harvesttime. Middlemen therefore earned at least 28% to 38% of the mandi price and 64% to 83% of the farmgate price, depending on the season when they bought and sold the crop. 11
III. The Experiment and the Data
Our experiment was conducted in a stratified random sample of 72 villages from the potato-growing blocks of Hugli and West Medinipur districts. To reduce information spillovers, we ensured that sample villages were at least 10 km apart from each other. In each block, sample villages were randomly assigned to three groups. In two groups of 24 villages each, we conducted two different information treatments, and in the third group, we provided no information. In the two treatment groups, we delivered daily information about the price in the mandis where potatoes from this village were generally resold. This was the price at which traders had resold potatoes to large buyers at these mandis the previous day. In our analysis, we refer to this as the mandi price. 12 In addition, we also delivered information about the previous day's price at the nearest city market.
In the 24 private information villages, the price information was delivered individually to four households selected randomly from our survey households. Every morning for eleven months, the telecallers based in our Kolkata information center relayed the mandi prices to each of these farmers via mobile phones that were given to them for the purpose of the project. The phones were merely a device by which to deliver the information. To ensure that they did not improve the farmers' connectivity more generally, we worked with the service provider to block outgoing calls from the phones and changed the phone settings so that farmers could not view their own number. We did not inform the farmers of their mobile phone numbers, and all phone bills were delivered to us. As we verified, farmers did not receive any incoming calls except from us. Our telecaller records indicate that 62% of all calls to private information recipients were received, and in 92% of the villages, at least one cell phone recipient answered the call.
In the 24 public information villages, we delivered the mandi price information to a local shopkeeper or phone booth owner (called the "vendor") in the village. For a nominal fee, he wrote the price information on charts and posted them in three public places in the village. 13 Through random checks, we were able to verify that the price information was posted regularly.
The information interventions were piloted in the sample villages from June to November 2007. The actual experiment began in January 2008 and continued daily until November 2008. All villages and households were in the same treatment or control group in 2008 as they were in 2007. All empirical estimates of the interventions on farmer quantities and revenues will be presented for the 2008 data.
A. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We conducted surveys with a stratified random sample of 24 potato-growing households in each of the 72 villages in our study. We restrict the analysis to the 1,545 sample farmers who planted either of the two main varieties ( jyoti and chandramukhi) of potatoes in 2008. A production survey was conducted in February, followed by a trade survey each fortnight between February and November. Table A2 in the appendix shows a number of village and household characteristics by treatment group, based on data collected before the pilot information interventions began in June 2007. Across all household characteristics, the preintervention differences across treatment groups were jointly insignificant.
B. Effect of Information on Farmers' Price Information
In the fortnightly trade surveys, we asked farmers how frequently they tracked prices in wholesale and retail potato markets and whom they collected the price information from. To analyze whether the interventions changed farmers' pricetracking behavior, we run a regression according to the specification
where y ivt measures whether farmer i in village v tracked wholesale prices in fortnight t (table 3, panel A, column 1), the number of days since he last tracked prices (column 2), and his source of information (column 3). Accordingly, we use a logit specification in column 1 and a Poisson regression in column 2. Private information and public information are dummy variables indicating the treatment group that the farmer's village is assigned to. In the villages that received 13 Telecallers and vendors were instructed to say that they did not know why the information was being delivered or how it could be used. the private information treatment, the four randomly chosen households that received information directly via mobile phone received a value of 1 for the phone recipient dummy, as well as a value of 1 for the Private Information dummy. Hence the coefficient on Private Information should be interpreted as the effect on farmers whose village received the private information treatment, but who did not personally receive phone calls. Their outcomes would presumably be affected through the spread of information within the village. Control variables include the household's landholding, indicator variables for the potato variety, district, and the survey month. For convenience, we report exponentiated coefficients in all three columns.
The results indicate that the intervention worked as planned. Farmers who received the interventions were significantly more likely to say that they track market prices and to have tracked them recently (columns 1 and 2). They were also more likely to report that they received the information through the intervention (column 3). The magnitude of the effects was larger in the public information treatment than in the private information treatment, and within the private information treatment, the effects were larger for phone recipients. Table 4 shows that the intervention improved the precision with which farmers tracked prices. When we match the prices that farmers reported with the actual prices in the markets that they tracked, the average sum of squares of the normalized error in reported price is 0.18 to 0.19 for intervention households, significantly lower than the 0.22 for control households. This represents a decrease of 13.9% in the mean absolute deviation from the true price. 14 6 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS The normalized "error" is the difference between the market price the farmer reports for a market in a given week and the average actual price in that market in that week. The reported means are the mean sums of squared normalized errors. * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
IV. Theory: Bargaining with Asymmetric Information
Consider a game with a single farmer F with an exogenous stock of potatoes Q, a single village trader VT (or equivalently, a collusive group of village traders), and a set of market traders located in a haat outside the village. F cannot sell potatoes directly at the mandi located outside the village. He can sell either to the VT or to a market trader. Every trader can resell the potatoes at the mandi at the prevailing price w, which they observe, and take as given. The farmer does not observe w, but he believes it follows a prior distribution G on support [w,w] where ∞ >w > w ≥ 0.
Following a realization of w, the sequence of moves is as follows. At stage 1, VT meets F and makes him a price offer p 1 . F decides whether and how much (q 1 ) to sell at this price. At stage 2, the farmer decides whether to incur a transport cost of s to visit the haat with a quantity q 2 ≤ Q − q 1 to sell to a market trader. He expects to receive at the haat a price h(w) that is strictly increasing in w and satisfies h(w) < w for all w. The price h(w) is determined through oligopolistic competition between market traders.
Let the total quantity the farmer sells be denoted by q ≡ q 1 + q 2 ∈ [0, Q]; the remainder Q − q is consumed. His net sales revenue is R ≡ p 1 q 1 + I[h(w)q 2 − s], where I ∈ {0, 1} denotes the decision to visit the haat. His payoff is W (R + βU(Q − q)), where W is a strictly increasing, smooth concave function satisfying W ≤ 0, and U is a strictly increasing, smooth, and strictly concave function satisfying U (0) = ∞. The parameter β ≥ 0 represents the importance of self-consumption in the farmer's payoff function. Our data show that farmers consume no more than 5% of their harvest, so we shall focus on the case where β is small. We assume throughout that w > βU (Q), so there are always gains from trade. In the limiting case where β = 0, the farmer either sells his entire harvest or nothing at all, and the problem reduces to selling an indivisible good.
Let q( p) denote the farmer's supply function, which maximizes pq+βU(Q−q), and define Π( p) ≡ pq( p)+βU (Q− q( p) ). Clearly q( p) is strictly positive at any price p satisfying p > βU (Q), and strictly increasing and approaches Q as p becomes arbitrarily large. Our first assumption is that the supply function is weakly concave (q (.) ≤ 0).
Second, we assume that W (Π( p)) is concave, so that an increase in farmgate price risk lowers F's welfare. In the limiting case where β is 0, this requires W to be weakly concave and includes the case where the farmer is risk neutral. Hence, we assume at least a mild level of risk aversion, with the required lower bound vanishing as β approaches 0.
Finally . We assume that if F knew the realization of w, then VT would have to offer him more than the monopsony price to prevent him from exercising his option to visit the haat. Specifically, for all w ∈ [w,w],
where F's reservation price M(w) is defined by
We also assume that Π(h(w)) > s, to ensure that M(.) is well defined and positive valued. We use weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (WPBE) as the equilibrium concept. Suppose V ≡ W (Π(.)). Then, formally, the equilibrium is a price offer by VT and an acceptance strategy for F p(w), a( p), with supporting posterior beliefs G(.|p) that obey Bayes' rule on the equilibrium path, where:
The outcome of any WPBE is a pattern of state-dependent trades, where in state w, F sells: h(w) ) to a market trader otherwise .
A. Classes of Equilibria
Different classes of equilibria vary in terms of how much information VT 's price offers convey to F about the realization of w. We first describe equilibria that reveal w entirely, then those that convey no information at all, and finally hybrid forms that convey some information. We then present the main results and explain the intuition behind them. Formal proofs can be found in the online appendix.
B. Fully Revealing Equilibrium
An equilibrium is said to be fully revealing or separating if the associated price offer function p(.) is strictly increasing in w. 
with end point constraint α(w) ≤ 1. 15 Along the equilibrium path, F can infer the exact realization of w from the observed price offer. The price offer equals F's reservation price corresponding to state w, so that F is indifferent between accepting and rejecting it. F accepts with probability α(w), which by construction creates an incentive for VT to offer the price M(w) when the state is w. Since M(w) > m(w) and VT 's payoff function is concave in the price, he is tempted to offer a price lower than M(w). However, the price offer reveals w to F, and, given F's outside option of selling at M(w), a lower price offer is less likely to be accepted. This offsets the larger profit that VT obtains if it is accepted. The possibility that trade does not occur is a deadweight loss arising from VT 's incentive compatibility constraint: VT is worse off when the price offer is not accepted, while F is indifferent.
C. Fully Nonrevealing Equilibrium
At the other extreme, if VT offers the same pricep irrespective of the realization of w and F accepts the offer with some positive probabilityᾱ, then the equilibrium reveals no information to F. When such a fully nonrevealing equilibrium (FNRE) exists andᾱ ∈ (0, 1), F must be indifferent between accepting and rejecting. Any such equilibrium is Pareto dominated by an equilibrium where the pooled pricē p is identical, but F instead accepts with probability 1. For this reason, we focus on FNRE withᾱ = 1. 16
Proposition 2. The following conditions are sufficient and (almost) necessary for the existence of a fully nonrevealing equilibrium, where VT offers the same pricep irrespective of the realization of w, and this price offer is accepted by F with probability 1: 17
FP1: w ≥p, wherep satisfies W (Π(p)) = E w [W (Π(M(w)))].
15 The equilibrium is supported by off-equilibrium path beliefs wherein any price offer below p(w) leads F to believe w = w with probability 1, and any price offer above p(w) leads him to believe w =w with probability one.
16 There may also exist FNRE involving a pooled price abovep where F is strictly better off accepting than rejecting and where the price offer is accepted with probability 1. Such an FNRE cannot be compared in the Pareto sense with the one we focus on below, because it makes F better off but makes VT worse off. In what follows, we ignore such FNRE by assuming that the equilibrium that maximizes VT 's payoff is selected. 17 It is supported by the following off-equilibrium-path beliefs: if the price offer is p ≤p, then F does not update his beliefs. If p ≥p, F believes w =w.
FP2: If the state isw, VT does not benefit from deviating from price offerp to price offer M(w), where M(w)
is also accepted with probability 1.
Note that while the the fully revealing equilibrium always exists, the fully nonrevealing equilibria can fail to exist if the support of the distribution of w is sufficiently wide. However, when this happens, partially revealing equilibria generally exist. We describe these next.
D. Partially Revealing Equilibrium
In a step function partially revealing equilibrium (SPRE), the price offer is a step function. The support of w is partitioned into a set of consecutive intervals I i ≡ [w i , w i+1 ], i = 1, . . . , n with w 1 = w and w n+1 =w. VT offers a constant pricep i when w is in [w i , w i+1 ), withp i >p i−1 . On the equilibrium path, F accepts offerp i with probability α i . The A partially revealing equilibrium is intermediate between a fully nonrevealing and fully revealing equilibrium. VT 's price offer varies in a coarse way with w: rising when w moves from one interval to the next but constant within any interval. As in a separating equilibrium, all price offers except the highest have to be rejected with some probability, and acceptance probabilities must rise with the price offer. In any interval I i = [w i , w i+1 ], when w is close to w i , VT is tempted to lower the price offer fromp
However the penalty for lowering the price is that the lower price will be rejected with a higher probability. Within any given interval I i , the price offer is constant, and trade takes place with some probability. The ratio of the probabilities that F acceptsp i and p i−1 is selected to ensure that condition PP2 holds. This is analogous to equation (3) in a fully revealing equilibrium.
There can also be equilibria that are partially revealing in other ways: price offer functions that are mixtures of step functions and strictly increasing segments. Clearly there is 8 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS a plethora of possible equilibria, varying in the extent of information that is revealed to F.
Since F is always indifferent between accepting and rejecting the price offers in each equilibrium, it is evident that the separating, fully nonrevealing, and partially revealing equilibria all generate the same ex ante welfare for F. However, VT 's ex ante welfare could vary. We turn to this issue next.
E. Comparing Profitability of Alternative Equilibria
We start by comparing the ex ante profits earned by VT in the selected FRE and FNRE, assuming the FNRE exists.
Proposition 4. If β is sufficiently small, VT earns a larger ex ante profit in the FNRE than in any FRE.
The key force driving the result is that trade may not occur at all in the FRE, whereas the FNRE always results in trade. Besides, the sale price in the FRE varies with the state, resulting in risk that benefits neither VT nor F. Since F has the same expected utility in both equilibria, the constant price in the FNRE is lower than the average price in the FRE. This lower average price in the FNRE also benefits VT , since the farmer's reservation price is higher than the monopsony price. From VT 's point of view, the FRE outperforms the FNRE in only one dimension: the quantity he purchases co-moves with the wholesale price, so that he purchases larger (resp. smaller) quantities when the wholesale price is high (resp. low). This benefit is small when F places a low value on personal consumption. At the same time the deadweight loss associated with failure to trade in most states remains bounded away from 0, so the FNRE results in a larger expected profit for VT when β is small enough.
Our final result considers the limiting case where β = 0 and shows that the FNRE is the most profitable equilibrium across all equilibria. If the FNRE does not exist, a similar result obtains for the comparison of step function partially revealing equilibria with more or less information revealed to the farmer (in the sense of Blackwell). Hence, profit-maximizing equilibria involve maximal pooling.
Proposition 5. Suppose β = 0 and an FNRE exists. Then the FNRE where a constant price offerp is accepted with probability 1 generates the largest ex ante profit of all WPBE equilibria.
F. Effects of Information Provision
Now consider how these equilibria are affected by an information intervention, which changes F's prior beliefs. There will be no effect at all if the equilibrium is fully revealing. Nonrevealing equilibria will be affected. Given the results in the previous section, we assume that the fully nonrevealing equilibrium exists and is the prevailing equilibrium selected by traders both before and after the intervention. 19 It is easiest to consider the case where the information provided by the intervention is represented by a partition of the set of possible wholesale prices: farmers receive a price signal σ(w) that takes the form of a step function, taking the value σ j when w ∈ I j ≡ [w j , w j+1 ], with j = 1, . . . , m, σ j+1 > σ j and w 1 = w, w m =w. The signal alters F's beliefs: signal realization σ j informs F that w ∈ I j . A fully nonrevealing equilibrium conditional on this new set of beliefs now involves a different pooled pricep j satisfy-
If j is low (resp. high), F learns that the wholesale price is low (resp. high), so that the pooled price is lower (resp. higher) than if F did not receive the signal. The price that F receives now comoves more with the wholesale price. We therefore expect to see a significant drop in price and traded quantity when the wholesale price is low and a significant rise in price and traded quantity when the wholesale price is high. The effects on the average price and quantity may thus be negligible. 20 Similar predictions obtain when the price signal does not alter the support of the farmer's beliefs if it satisfies a monotone likelihood property such that low values of w are correlated with low values of the signal. Given a signal σ that induces the farmer's beliefs over w to be updated to
G(.|σ), the intervention results in a pooled pricep(σ) satisfying W (Π(p(σ))) = E {G(w|σ)} [W (Π(M(w)))].
If σ and w are positively correlated, high (resp. low) realizations of w and σ tend to occur together with high probability, causingp to co-move with w. Compared to before the intervention, the farmgate price and sold quantity now co-move more with the wholesale price and are lower (resp. higher) when the wholesale price is lower (resp. higher) than average.
These predictions are summarized in the first row of table 5 and turn out to be different from predictions of other competing models of the trading mechanism that we describe in section VI. However, the model predicts that information provision leaves the farmer's ex ante welfare unaffected. Conditional on signal σ j , the farmer's welfare is E w|w∈I j [W (Π(M(w) 
))], so the unconditional ex ante welfare is E[W (Π(M(w)))].
This is a general property of all equilibria, both before and after the provision of information. The arguments above indicate that the effect on the village trader's welfare is negative if β is sufficiently small. Hence, information provision results in an ex ante Pareto inferior outcome.
V. Experimental Results
We simplify the empirical analysis by aggregating the data to the annual level. The empirical results are not substantially We assume that in the bargaining model, the fully nonrevealing equilibrium exists and is selected at baseline. Columns 1 and 3 include dummy variables for variety, quality, and district of farmer's residence. Columns 2 and 4 include dummies for the quality as well as the mandi whose catchment area the farmer resides in. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level.
* * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1. modified when we extend the model to incorporate dynamic aspects (see section B in the appendix).
A. Average Treatment Effects
We start by estimating the effect of the interventions on the farmers' sales and revenues. Our data include information about the quantity of potatoes of each variety and self-reported quality grade that a given farmer sold in each transaction in 2008, and the gross revenue and the net (of transport, handling, and storage costs) revenue and price per kilogram he received. We aggregate the sales of each varietyquality combination by farmer across the year to compute the annual quantity sold and the annual average of farmgate price. Table 6 shows the average treatment impacts. The regression specification follows equation (1), where y ikqv is the dependent variable: annual quantity of variety k and quality q sold by farmer i in village v, and net farmgate price, which is the ratio of the annual net revenue received to the quantity sold. 21 Besides controlling for the farmer's landholding size, all regressions include dummies for the potato variety and quality.
In other columns, we include mandi fixed effects to control for fixed differences at the mandi level. In column 1, the sign of the coefficient for all three intervention dummies is positive, but none of them is significantly different from 0. Including mandi fixed effects in column 2 reverses the sign of the private information and the public information coefficients, and they all remain insignificant, consistent with our theoretical predictions. 22 Columns 3 and 4 show no significant average impact of the intervention on farmgate prices. In figure 1 in the appendix, we plot average weekly farmgate prices in the treatment and the control villages and the corresponding mandi prices. In line with our regression results, there is no discernible difference between the different farmgate price series.
B. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
The main prediction of the ex post bargaining model in section IV is that informing farmers about the mandi price would increase the quantity they sold and price they received if the mandi price was high, and lower it if the mandi price was low. To verify this prediction rigorously, we use the regression specification: In columns 1 and 5, the price regressor is the relevant mandi price averaged over the weeks in 2008 when the farmer sold potatoes of that variety. In column 2, it is the relevant mandi price averaged over all weeks in 2008, with each week weighted in proportion to the quantity sold that week by sample farmers in control villages in that district. In column 3, it is the average deviation of the relevant mandi price in 2008 from the predicted mandi price for 2008, where the prediction is from a linear regression of weekly mandi prices for 2007, 2011, and 2012 on mandi dummies, period dummies, year dummies, and their interactions. In column 5, the sample is restricted to farmers who likely were in long-term relationships with buyers, as assessed from their reports in 2010 of selling to a buyer whom they had been selling to for longer than five years. In column 4, in the (unreported) first stage, we instrument the mandi price with the city retail price and its interaction with the distance between the mandi and the city. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for weak instruments is 24.17. All columns include dummies for the quality of potatoes sold, and column 3 also includes dummies for the potato variety. Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 include dummies for the mandi whose catchment area the farmer resides in. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 and are village-cluster bootstrapped in column 3. * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, and
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
where ν ikm is the realized average price (or price shock) in mandi m. As before, standard errors are clustered at the village level. For these heterogeneous effects to be identified, it must be the case that the mandi price is uncorrelated with the error term in the regression. In particular, it is important that variation in mandi prices not be correlated with variation in unobserved characteristics that might also affect the passthrough of prices. Note first that our experiment involved only a small fraction of the villages supplying to each market, so wholesale mandi prices were unlikely to be affected by our treatments. As table A3 in the appendix shows, within any district, mandis with average annual prices above and below the median were not significantly different in distance from the retail market, access to metaled roads, agricultural wage rates, or presence of industry or manufacturing. There is some evidence (only in Hugli district) that the average yield was slightly higher in villages under mandis with the above-median annual average price and that the residents of these villages were less likely to have landline phones. However, the mandi fixed effects in our regressions control for these differences. 23 Below we also discuss a robustness check where we instrument for the mandi price with the city price.
The results in tables 7 and 8 correspond to quantity sold and price per kilogram, respectively. The different columns 23 Results are qualitatively similar when mandi fixed effects are not included.
in table 7 use different specifications of the mandi price, different samples, and different dependent variables. Focus first on columns 1 through 4, where all 1,545 farmers are included in the sample, and the total quantity of potatoes sold (in kilograms) is regressed on the intervention dummies and their interactions with the price regressor. In column 1, the price regressor is the mandi price for each farmer-variety combination in the sample, averaged over the weeks when the farmer sold the variety. Thus, it represents the average resale price the trader could have received for potatoes he purchased from this farmer. We estimate how farmer outcomes vary with this price.
We see a positive coefficient on the mandi price average, although it is not significant. 24 The intercept effects on both the private and public information treatments are negative, and the interactions of the treatment with the average mandi price are positive. In other words, the information interventions caused farmers facing a low mandi price to sell a smaller quantity than they would have sold otherwise. However, at higher mandi prices, this negative effect was attenuated. The results indicate that in a village facing the 10th percentile of mandi price, the private information intervention caused a (phone nonrecipient) farmer to reduce sales by 1,090 kg (or 28% of the control mean, significant 24 If the baseline equilibrium is FNRE, we expect no relationship between the mandi price and the quantity sold or price received. However, if the FNRE does not exist, then the baseline equilibrium is partially pooling, in which case a higher mandi price causes the village trader to offer the farmer a higher price and the farmer responds by selling more. Notes below table 7 apply. Revenue (net of transport, handling and storage costs) is discounted to account for the implicit interest cost of delays from the time of sale to the receipt of payment, and is then divided by the quantity sold to arrive at the net price received.
at 10%), and the public information intervention caused the farmer to reduce sales by 1,189 kg (or 31%, significant at 5%). In a village facing the 90th percentile of mandi price, the private and public information caused farmers to sell an additional 1,158 kg (or 30%) and 723 kg (or 19%), respectively, although these two positive effects are not statistically significant. From column 1 in table 8, we calculate that in a village facing the 10th percentile of mandi price, the private information intervention lowered the farmgate price received by a phone nonrecipient farmer by 18 paise (or 9%), whereas in a village facing the 90th percentile of the mandi price, it increased his farmgate price by 24 paise (or 12%).
The weights used to compute the farmer-specific mandi price average in column 1 are endogenous to a farmer's decision to sell: if he chooses to sell only when the actual mandi price is high, this average is an overestimate of the true average mandi price the farmer was facing. This concern is addressed in column 2 by instead using an average where the weekly mandi prices are weighted by the volume of potatoes sold in that week by sample farmers in control villages in that district. This average is exogenous to the farmer's decision to sell but may be less relevant to the farmgate price. We continue to see a large and statistically significant negative intercept effect and positive slope effect of the private information interventions. The signs are similar for the public information treatment, although the slope coefficient is not precisely estimated.
Note that in the bargaining model, the information intervention changes the equilibrium because it informs the farmer that the mandi price is either higher or lower than the expected price. So in column 3, instead of using the actual mandi price as the regressor, we use the deviation of the 2008 mandi price from the predicted price, using weekly mandi prices from other years for which we have data (2007, 2011, and 2012) to generate the prediction. Under standard rational expectation assumptions, this mandi price "shock" ought to be orthogonal to farmers' ex ante price information and other relevant characteristics. 25 Note the intercept effect of the interventions now measures the effect of the treatment for farmers selling in states where the expected mandi price equaled the actual price, unlike previous specifications where the intercept effects pertained to a hypothetical mandi price of 0. The model predicts that if the intervention does not change the farmer's belief about the prevailing price, it cannot change the equilibrium. The interaction term of the treatment with the slope coefficient continues to have the same interpretation: it estimates the effect of the intervention when the actual price is above the expected price.
As expected, we see in column 3 that the intercept terms are nonsignificant. The effects of the information treatments on the slope coefficient are positive, and the one on the private intervention is statistically significant. 26 In column 4, we instrument the mandi price with the interaction of the city price and the distance between the mandi and the city. This addresses the concern that mandi price changes may be endogenous to the intervention. If the city price is unaffected by the price in any given mandi, the exclusion restriction is satisfied. As we know from table 2, there is considerable 12 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS pass-through from the city price to the mandi price; hence, it is unsurprising that the instruments are not weak. 27 Our results for the private information treatment are quantitatively and qualitatively similar when we use the instrumented mandi price instead of the actual.
VI. Testing Alternative Models
We now discuss whether the experimental results are consistent with alternative models of the farmer-trader trading mechanism.
A. Risk-Sharing Contracts with Full Commitment
An ex ante contract would specify the quantity that the farmer sells and the price the middleman pays for each realization of w (reported by the trader). This would allow the middleman and farmer to share price risk. In a direct analogy to implicit wage employment contracts where firms insure workers against privately observed product price shocks (Hart, 1983) , a risk-neutral middleman would pay the farmer a constant price regardless of the wholesale price. Since the middleman bears all the residual risk, he has no incentive to understate the wholesale price; his private information does not create any distortions. The middleman margins could then represent risk premiums on this price insurance. This would generate the observed low price transmission. This also implies that the experiment would have no impact at all. We summarize this prediction in the second row of table 5. This contrasts with our result that the information provision increased pass-through.
Asymmetric information generates distortions only if middlemen are also risk-averse. A risk-averse middleman wants to understate the wholesale price so as to persuade the farmer to accept a lower price. To keep the middleman honest, traded quantities are distorted downward when the wholesale price is low, and are set at the efficient level when the price is at the maximum (the standard no-distortionat-the-top result). Information interventions that reduce the asymmetry of information would reduce this screening distortion. This would cause the traded quantity to increase at low wholesale prices but have no effect at high wholesale prices. Thus risk-sharing contracts with asymmetric information predict a positive average treatment effect on quantity transacted; the treatment effect would especially be positive in low-market-price states and would vanish in high-price states. This prediction is summarized in the third row of table 5. In contrast, our experimental results show a significant negative impact on quantity traded in low-price states.
B. Risk-Sharing Contracts with Limited Commitment
Limited-commitment contracting models have been used widely to explain insurance and marketing contracts. These 27 They pass the Kleinberg-Paap test for weak instruments with an F-statistic of 24.17. models allow for the possibility of ex post moral hazard: when the outside spot market price exceeds the risk-sharing price, the farmer might renege on the contract and sell there instead (Ligon et al., 2002; Blouin & Machiavello, 2013; Machiavello & Morjaria, 2015; Saenger, Torero, & Qaim, 2014) . Informing the farmer about market prices increases this hazard, reducing traders' profits in the states when the guaranteed farmgate price is below the spot market price, thereby limiting their ability to pay the guaranteed price when it is above the spot market price. This can unravel the insurance arrangement, increasing the pass-through from the wholesale price to the farmgate price. Accordingly, the farmer would sell less (resp. more) to the middleman when the market price was lower (resp. higher) than average.
Note first that the farmers in our study were unable to sell directly to buyers at the wholesale markets, making ex post moral hazard very unlikely. Second, for our results to be consistent with limited-commitment contracting, traders must lose money in some states of the world-in particular, when the mandi price is very low, below the farmgate price. Indeed, this is a sine qua non of any insurance arrangement. (We summarize this prediction in the fourth row of table 5.) We do not find empirical evidence supporting this. During the 2008 harvest, the lower bounds of the trader net margin at the four quartiles of the mandi price were Rs −0.10, 0.53, 1.94, and 3.21, respectively. 28 In the lowest quartile of the mandi price, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the true margin is 0. Thus, even when mandi prices were extremely low, there is no evidence that the lower bound of the trader net margin was less than 0. 29
C. Standard Oligopoly Models
Standard trade and industrial organization models of price pass-through in vertical supply chains assume monopolistic competition in the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . They involve a simultaneous move game where each middleman selects his price (see, e.g., Atkin & Donaldson, 2014; Gopinath & Itskhoki, 2010; Weyl & Fabinger, 2013; VillasBoas, 2007) . Perfect competition and perfect collusion are limiting special cases. This corresponds to a variant of our model where village and market traders make simultaneous price offers to the farmer. The farmer responds by selecting one of the offers and a corresponding quantity to sell, or else remains in autarky. Providing information to farmers would not change anyone's payoff function: farmer payoffs depend only on the price offers of the traders since they cannot sell directly in the market themselves, and traders know their resale price regardless of the intervention. Hence, unlike the significant heterogeneous treatment effects that we observe, this class of models predicts that the information interventions should have no effect. (See the fourth row of  table 5.) Finally, models with costly search frictions like those of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) predict that information interventions that lower farmers' costs of searching for traders offering the highest price would decrease price dispersion across farmers and sales locations. (See the fifth row of table 5.) However since village middlemen and farmers live within close proximity of each other and meet frequently, we expect these search costs to be negligible. Therefore, we do not expect any effects on the dispersion of prices across farmers. As Table A5 in the appendix shows, there is no evidence that either intervention caused farmgate prices to become more similar within the village or the haat price to become more similar across haats.
VII. Conclusion
Unlike other settings where producers have direct access to markets, large transactions costs and regulations prevent potato farmers in West Bengal from selling to wholesale buyers directly. We have provided evidence that marketing middlemen earn large margins on average. Our surveys as well as experimental evidence provide support for a model of ex post bargaining in which wholesale price fluctuations are not passed through to farmers. While by itself this might suggest that farmers and traders enter into insurance contracts, we have shown that the entire set of empirical findings is inconsistent with insurance arrangements. Hence, insurance premiums cannot account for the large middleman margins. Instead, we argue that the margins reflect barriers to entry into the trading business and farmers' limited access to markets. Our results also show that in the context of such vertical supply chains, improving farmers' access to price information is unlikely to have positive outcomes on farmgate prices. Hence researchers and policymakers need to focus greater attention on promoting competition among buyers and enhancing farmer access to wholesale markets.
